



Directorate of
Intelligence

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000501050002-4

Secret



Handwritten: 000000
mini file

Are the Soviets Interested in Deep Reductions in Strategic Forces? (U)

An Intelligence Memorandum

Secret

SOV 82-10064X
April 1982

Copy 250

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000501050002-4

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000501050002-4



Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000501050002-4
Directorate of Intelligence

Secret

Are the Soviets Interested in Deep Reductions in Strategic Forces? (U)

An Intelligence Memorandum

*Information available as of 22 April 1982
has been used in the preparation of this report.*

This memorandum was prepared by [] of
the Current Support Division, Office of Soviet
Analysis. It was coordinated with the Arms
Control Intelligence Staff and the National
Intelligence Council. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Current
Support Division, on []

25X1

Secret

SOV 82-10064X

April 1982

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000501050002-4

Secret

25X1

**Are the Soviets Interested
in Deep Reductions
in Strategic Forces?**

25X1

Summary

Soviet commentaries about possible future agreement on "deep cuts" in the level of US and Soviet strategic arms have become more frequent during the past year. In part, at least, they are intended to respond to US criticism that the ceilings negotiated in SALT II are relatively high and to demonstrate interest in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START).

25X1

Moscow has claimed, however, that its willingness to negotiate deep cuts would depend on satisfactory treatment of Soviet concerns about US "forward-based systems," the prospective deployment of US ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles, and the nuclear forces of the United Kingdom, France, and China. Even if these matters were resolved—and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) talks rather than START could prove to be the forum—it is doubtful that the Soviets would accept cuts much below 2,000 intercontinental delivery vehicles.

25X1

Secret

SOV 82-10064X

Secret

25X1

**Are the Soviets Interested
in Deep Reductions
in Strategic Forces?**

25X1

On 1 December 1981, [redacted]

[redacted] Soviet President Brezhnev asserted that the USSR is in favor of reductions in strategic arms but claimed that SALT II already provides for "very substantial" cuts. Further reductions, he stated, must take into account "all factors that determine the strategic situation," as well as the principle of equality and equal security. [redacted]

25X1

This qualification has often been expressed in the past by Soviet spokesmen. It typically means from the Soviets' point of view that a START and/or INF agreement must deal with three particular Soviet concerns. These are US "forward-based" systems (FBS), potential US cruise missile deployment, and third-country nuclear forces. [redacted]

25X1

**Soviet Statements
in 1981-82**

Last year, Moscow's view of deep reductions was frequently explained in Soviet journals and press accounts. Most of the commentaries were skeptical of US intentions and emphasized the following points:

- Moscow had historically championed the idea of deep cuts and had gone further than Washington in advocating the elimination of all nuclear weapons and stockpiles.
- Deep cuts could be negotiated only according to the principle of equality and equal security and would require a resolution of the Soviet concerns cited above.
- The Soviets doubted the seriousness of US proposals. [redacted]

25X1

Despite such reservations, Moscow continued to signal its interest in deep cuts in discussions held with Western officials in various arms control forums. In August 1981, Oleg Bykov, deputy director of the Institute for World Economics and International Relations, indicated to an official of the International Institute of Strategic Studies that the Soviets might well look with favor at the idea of reductions below the levels in the unratified SALT II Treaty. Bykov claimed that when President Carter had proposed the lower levels in 1977, the timing had been wrong and the US handling of the proposal had been clumsy. He indicated that if the possibility of such reductions were raised again, Moscow would be more receptive. [redacted]

25X1

In November 1981 a Soviet adviser to the SALT Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) told a US counterpart that the USSR was prepared for deep reductions in intercontinental delivery vehicles. The proof of this attitude, he said, was Moscow's agreement to the SALT II Treaty. He doubted US readiness for such reductions. []

25X1

To further fan Washington's interest in resuming strategic arms talks, Brezhnev addressed another major US concern—verification—in November. In an interview published by *Der Spiegel*, he indicated that “given confidence” the two nations could negotiate some type of cooperative measures to augment national technical means of verification. []

25X1

In January 1982 Vitaliy Zhurkin, deputy director of the USA Institute, indicated to US participants at a meeting of the United Nations Association that the Soviets were willing to explore the idea of deep cuts. He asked rhetorically what had happened to this idea and whether it had faded away. He added that the USSR would regard any such US proposal favorably. []

Brezhnev again stressed the importance of strategic arms talks in March 1982 in a speech to the Soviet Trade Union Congress. His remarks can be viewed as a mixture of inducements and threats, apparently aimed at encouraging the arms control dialogue, preserving the “positive elements” of the SALT II Treaty, and expressing growing impatience with what Moscow regards as Washington's foot-dragging on START. Brezhnev's letters to the Australian and Japanese “peace” groups in February and March also reflect some of these considerations. []

25X1

Why the Apparent Interest Now?

Brezhnev's Trade Union Congress speech was particularly noteworthy because of the sense of urgency in his remarks on strategic arms talks. Without an agreement soon, he warned, both sides could develop new types of weapons of mass destruction that might undermine the current opportunities for limitation, reduction, and verification. []

25X1

The Soviet leaders believe that their arms control policy since the late 1960s has brought them both military and political gains, particularly in restraining US defense programs. In the 1980s, however—since the invasion of Afghanistan and the more recent involvement in Polish affairs—they have recognized that a deep-seated and unfavorable shift has occurred in US attitudes toward the USSR and national security policy. They see an assertive US administration capitalizing on this shift and pursuing defense programs bent on reversing the strategic gains the Soviets have made over the past decade. []

25X1

Secret

A new arms control agreement would be valuable, in Moscow's view, because it would offer an opportunity to regulate US programs and possibly to stagnate competition in areas where the United States might have a technological advantage—cruise missiles, antiballistic missiles, and space weaponry. Regulating or slowing US programs would facilitate Soviet planning, reduce weapons costs, and, in significant areas, minimize the possibility of technological surprise. These results translate directly into military and military-industrial benefits. []

25X1

The Soviets believe a new strategic arms agreement—or even the prospect of one—would also yield political and economic benefits. They might anticipate that a renewed strategic arms dialogue could create a more favorable political climate, which could arrest the trend toward Western sanctions that began with their invasion of Afghanistan and was broadened by the declaration of martial law in Poland. Moreover, Moscow has long believed that strategic arms negotiations contribute to warmer Soviet-US ties generally, which in turn facilitate Soviet access to Western credits, goods, and technology, and thus mitigate economic problems at home and in Eastern Europe. As became clear in the 1970s, the Soviets expect this favorable arrangement to continue regardless of their activities in the Third World. Because its economic problems are becoming serious, Moscow probably attaches as much importance to the political and economic benefits that might result from renewal of a dialogue as it does to any limitations of US strategic programs that might eventually be negotiated. []

X1

**Moscow's Conditions
for Serious
Negotiations**

The Soviets have indicated they would be amenable to discussing deep cuts in START if the INF talks or START addressed their concerns about US FBS and third-country nuclear forces. They are more interested in those concerns than in the particular forum, but currently—probably because the INF talks are under way and START is not—they are insisting that these forces should be negotiated in the INF framework. They claim, moreover, that British and French nuclear forces are an integral part of an existing European balance in “medium-range” forces. []

25X1

In discussing their INF reductions proposal in Geneva last December, Soviet officials equated the Soviet “medium-range” systems that would remain in the western USSR in 1990 with comparable French and British systems. Those Allied forces would remain free of direct limits under Moscow's proposal. The Soviets indicated, however, that they would expect future increases in these forces to be compensated for by reductions in US forces in Europe and that any increase without such compensation should allow Moscow to increase its own forces proportionately []

25X1

X1 Some of these arguments on US FBS and third-country nuclear forces hark back to positions the Soviets first established during the SALT I negotiations. At that time they began espousing their view of equality and equal security, arguing that an agreement must consider not only US intercontinental systems, but also any Western systems that could strike the USSR. []

As a result, the Soviets see US deployment of thousands of long-range cruise missiles worldwide as incompatible with any agreement calling for deep reductions in intercontinental systems. They indicated during the fall 1980 session of the SCC that they would not cut back their strategic delivery vehicles to the 2,250 level in the SALT II Treaty without an extension of the Treaty's Protocol (which eventually expired at the end of 1981) or a resolution of such Protocol issues as the deployment of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles. More recently, an article in the 12 January 1982 issue of *Krasnaya Zvezda* stated:

X1 *There should be no doubt that even an incomplete realization of US plans for the deployment of cruise missiles not covered by an agreement would create objective difficulties in the path of a substantial reduction in strategic armaments.* []

In his speech at the Trade Union Congress, Brezhnev underscored Soviet concern about such US plans by proposing a ban on sea- or ground-launched cruise missile deployment pending the resumption of strategic arms talks. His proposal was essentially a reiteration of a provision governing these types of cruise missiles in the Protocol, which the Soviets still believe is an integral part of the SALT II Treaty. []

25X1

How Much Might Moscow Agree To Reduce?

In 1979, along with the SALT II Treaty, a joint statement for SALT III was negotiated, which called for "significant and substantial reductions" in strategic arms. The Soviets have never specifically spelled out what they would consider such reductions to be. During the SALT II negotiations, they rejected a US attempt to set a goal for SALT III limiting strategic delivery vehicles to 1,800 to 2,000, claiming that such a proposal would predetermine future negotiations. They stated, however, that SALT III cuts should be "significant" and not "token." []

25X1

The Soviets have shown some flexibility in negotiating lower total numbers for intercontinental delivery vehicles. They rejected cuts to 2,000 delivery vehicles, which the United States proposed in March 1977 during SALT II discussions, but they did accept a level of 2,250 in April 1978. This figure is 150 less than the limit originally negotiated at Vladivostok in 1974 and about 250 less than their current inventory. The Soviets may wish to express interest now in deep reductions in intercontinental forces to parallel their position on radically reducing INF in the Geneva negotiations. []

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000501050002-4

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000501050002-4

Secret

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000501050002-4

Secret

Approved For Release 2006/05/25 : CIA-RDP84B00049R000501050002-4